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HOW POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 
AFFECTED EUROPE’S DECISION TO OPPOSE 
AND THEN ADOPT EMISSIONS TRADING 
BRETTNY HARDY† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The politics of international environmental regulation can be 
mystifying. As one scholar, Jonathan Wiener, has noted, 
environmental regulation is often difficult to explain at the domestic 
level.1  It becomes even more baffling when environmental regulation 
reaches a global scale.2  The international management of global 
warming is no exception. 
Currently, greenhouse gas pollution that causes global warming 
is one of the biggest environmental problems facing regulators.  It is 
international in scope and effect.  Most scientists agree that global 
warming is a dangerous threat that can potentially destabilize the 
planet if managers do not take action soon.4 
The international community has been aware of the threat of 
global warming for decades.  The first international treaty to combat 
 
 † Brettny Hardy is a J.D. candidate at Duke Law School and an M.E.M. candidate at the 
Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University.  She would like to 
thank Jonathan Wiener for his valuable advice and never-ending patience throughout the 
writing process. 
 1. See generally Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global 
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEORGETOWN L.J., 749 (1999). 
 2. Id. 
 4. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL FINGERPRINTS OF GREENHOUSE 
WARMING: A SUMMARY OF RECENT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2006), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
Pew%20Center%5FGlobal%20Fingerprints%5F3%2E06%2Epdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (Feb. 
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf; Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts 
to Issue of Irreparable Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1. 
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global warming, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), was signed in 1992 and went into effect 
in 1994.5  Since that time, however, countries have had a hard time 
agreeing on the best solution to reduce greenhouse gases.  The 
United States initially pushed for international emissions trading as 
the best approach.  More recently for the United States, however, 
inaction has become the norm when it comes to global warming.  
Legislators have hesitated to proceed authoritatively, fearing that no 
plan will decrease global emissions in a way that protects the U.S. 
economy.6 
The European Union (E.U.), on the other hand, has become one 
of the biggest proponents for trading.  In 2005, the European Union 
launched a greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the 
largest emission trading program in the world.7  The trading system is 
a market solution to greenhouse gas emissions.  Governments set a 
cap for overall emissions, but allow industry to trade allowances in an 
open market, so that the emitters with the most efficient means of 
reducing pollution act first.8 
Even so, the E.U. has not historically championed emissions 
trading.  At first, the European Commission did not favor a market 
approach to global warming, but instead supported a uniform 
emissions tax for polluters.  In fact, the E.U. rejected the notion of an 
ETS even up until 1999.9  But once European managers caught on to 
the idea of emissions trading, they did not hesitate to prepare and 
institute a global market for greenhouse gas emissions.10 
In some ways, the E.U.’s reaction to global warming aligns with 
its typically proactive stance in the face of risk.  Many commentators 
have noted that Europe often acts quickly and informally to tackle 
 
 5. Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of Parties 
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201, 
202-03. 
 6. Instead of enacting regulatory measures to decrease greenhouse gases, the United 
States has chosen to rely on voluntary reductions from businesses.  The United States has also 
encouraged the development of cleaner technologies.  Miranda A. Schreurs, The Climate 
Change Divide: The European Union, the United States, and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol, in 
GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 207, 219-22 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004). 
 7. Susan J. Kurkowski, Note, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: 
Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698, 699 (2006). 
 8. Joe Kruger & Christian Egenhofer, Confidence Through Compliance in Emissions 
Trading Markets, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y Winter 2006 (Vol. VI) 2, 2. 
 9. See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text. 
 10. Id. 
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environmental issues without worrying about whether a solution will 
exactly fit the problem.11  But, the trading scheme does not completely 
conform to European ideology.  Europe has not often favored market 
solutions for environmental problems, relying instead on actions that 
control pollution from the top down.12  The E.U. performed an 
extreme about-face when it shifted its focus from a command and 
control approach (e.g. tax) to a cap-and-trade solution.  Something 
that was initially unpleasant”” for Europe became the ideal solution 
almost overnight. 
The E.U.’s new ETS thus presents some interesting questions.  
What caused Europe to change its mind so quickly regarding the best 
solution for global warming?  Did political factors cause Europe to 
act too fast in developing its emissions trading program instead of 
fully evaluating the costs and benefits to ensure that its trading 
approach would provide the best solution?  This paper attempts to 
address these questions by first considering the political climate 
surrounding the E.U.’s sudden change of heart and then analyzing the 
E.U.’s assessment of its emissions trading program.  I argue that 
Europe’s decision to invest in emissions trading involved a number of 
factors, but largely arose because it was a way for Europe to gain 
advantages over other countries in the global greenhouse gas market.  
Further, rent-seeking politics may not have led Europe toward the 
perfect solution “”with emissions trading, but the E.U. has fully 
invested itself into the ETS process, constantly readjusting its 
program when it finds problems. 
Part II will briefly outline the history leading up to the 
implementation of ETS in Europe.  Part III will discuss the reasons 
why the E.U. suddenly changed its preferences.  Part IV will describe 
the emissions trading scheme. Part V will address the potential 
 
 11. See Ludwig Kraemer, Development of Environmental Policies in the U.S. and Europe: 
Convergence or Divergence, in GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 55 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004).  To be 
sure, the European Union does not always act swiftly in the face of environmental uncertainty.  
The reality of European action is much more complex when analyzed on a closer level.  See 
generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and 
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 207 
(2003). 
 12. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal 
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the 
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 865, 896-97 (2005) (describing the general preference among the European 
public for pollution taxes over emissions trading). 
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problems and pitfalls of Europe’s approach.  Finally, Part VI will 
discuss whether Europe acted too quickly. 
II.  THE ROAD LEADING UP TO THE E.U. ETS 
In 2003, the E.U. adopted a directive to initiate emissions trading 
within the E.U. and in 2005, the E.U. was the first state to officially 
begin operating an ETS for greenhouse gas emissions.13  Today, 
Europe is one of the biggest proponents of a global trading market as 
a way to alleviate global warming.14  But the E.U. has not always been 
in favor of trading.  During most of the 1990s, the E.U. adamantly 
opposed market mechanisms as environmental regulatory options. 
After the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) went into effect in 1994, the E.U. attempted to 
block emissions trading as a method to reduce greenhouse gas 
pollution.  At the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) to the 
UNFCCC in 1995, Japan, Canada, the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand lobbied for the inclusion of emissions trading which 
would allow states flexibility in meeting UNFCCC targets.15  
European countries stood in opposition to those proposals, preferring 
hard-nosed approaches like a community-wide carbon tax.16  During 
negotiations at subsequent COPs, the United States and others 
continued to push for emissions trading as a cost-effective way of 
combating global warming, but the E.U. continued to oppose such 
mechanisms. 
Even as late as 1997, just before the negotiations in Kyoto, the 
insistence on emissions trading by the U.S. ‘was met with caution 
from most European countries’ because they ‘feared that trading 
might provide a cheap way for the U.S., Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand to ‘buy’ themselves out of their obligations’ and 
because there was ‘a certain mistrust of such concepts by 
continental European countries.’17 
 
 13. Catherine Boemare, Philippe Quirion, & Steve Sorrell, The Evolution of Emissions 
Trading in the E.U.: Tensions Between National Trading Schemes and the Proposed E.U. 
Directive, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S105, S106 (2003). 
 14. See Atle C. Christiansen & Jørgen Wettestad, The E.U. as a Frontrunner on 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did it Happen and Will the E.U. Succeed?, 3 
CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 4 (2003). 
 15. Atle C. Christiansen, The Role of Flexibility Mechanisms in E.U. Climate Strategy: 
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges., 4 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 27, 
28 (2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Edwin Woerdman, Path-Dependant Climate Policy: The History and Future of 
Emissions Trading in Europe, 14 EUR. ENV’T 261, 262 (2004) (quoting S. OBERTHÜR & H.E. 
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During the negotiations in Kyoto, however, the E.U. eventually 
conceded to make trading a part of the Kyoto Protocol in order to 
gain concessions from the United States and Russia concerning 
emissions targets.18  Although the E.U. continued to limit the use of 
emissions trading after the Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature 
in 1997, 19 there were signs that the E.U. was changing its position. 
In 1998, the European Environment Commissioner noted that 
the E.U. needed to get involved in emissions trading so that other 
countries did not entirely “dictate the rules.”20  A communication also 
noted that it might be possible for the E.U. to establish its own 
trading system by 2005.21  In 1999, another communication alluded to 
the cost-savings of a broad and comprehensive trading system.22  But, 
it was not until 2000 that the E.U. formally broadcast its acceptance 
of emissions trading.  The E.U. issued a Green Paper that outlined 
several options for initiating a full trading system.23  Then in 2001, the 
Commission issued a formal directive with a proposal for a 
mandatory system that would allow the trading of carbon dioxide 
emissions between several industrial sectors.24  The Council of 
Environmental Ministers upheld the proposal in 2002, and the 
Parliament endorsed the proposal with some minor changes in 2003. 25 
E.U. action on emissions trading was relatively fast.  After the 
E.U. issued a proposal for trading, the final directive outlining a plan 
for the E.U. ETS was finalized only two years later.  What’s more 
surprising is that the ETS gained approval so quickly, considering that 
the E.U. had spent many years in efforts to oppose the plan. 
III.  REASONS FOR THE ABOUT-FACE 
During the past decade, the E.U. has evolved from an enemy of 
cap-and-trade to a frontrunner in emissions trading.  The change in 
E.U. policy is noteworthy both for the speed with which it happened 
 
OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 188-
90 (1999)) 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Jørgen Wettestad, The Making of the 2003 E.U. Emissions Trading Directive: An Ultra-
Quick Process Due to Entrepreneurial Proficiency, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 1, 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Id. at 4-5 
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and because it resulted in a complete reversal of policy for the E.U.  
This section will address how this regulatory about-face happened so 
quickly and the reasons behind the change, briefly summarizing some 
of the conditions surrounding E.U. action when it instituted an 
emissions trading approach. 
A. Failure of the Carbon Tax 
One of the main reasons the E.U. began supporting an emissions 
trading program is that the carbon tax program it had initially 
proposed did not have political support.  In the early 1990s, the 
European Commission supported a tax partly because it was difficult 
for the Commission to ensure uniform implementation and 
compliance of regulations throughout Europe.26  The thinking was 
that European governments might have an incentive to oversee a tax 
if individual governments could derive revenues as a result.27  By the 
time the Kyoto negotiations began, however, efforts to implement a 
tax through the European Council of Ministers had failed.  A carbon 
tax did not have support from industry or from certain key European 
nations like the U.K. and Spain.28 
This may have been because a carbon tax provided less flexibility 
for member states.  A carbon tax would have been uniform across 
Europe in order to create efficiency for the E.U., but E.U. members 
have varying amounts of pollution and wealth.  A tax would impose 
the same on all countries, rich and poor.  Moreover, some members 
would have been paying a great deal more in taxes than others.  Using 
a trading scheme would improve flexibility.  Under cap-and-trade, the 
E.U. could set one overall cap on emissions, but allocate allowances 
to each country based on its individual emissions.  The E.U. could 
grant poorer countries more allowances to soften differences in 
economic impact across member states.  Furthermore, trading meant 
less pressure on industry if the allowances were initially issued for 
free, whereas a tax (or auctioned allowances) charges industry for all 
residual emissions. 
It should also be noted that when the E.U. started to investigate 
the possibility of taxes, there were only fifteen member states within 
the E.U.  By the time the ETS was introduced, there were twenty-five 
members (now there are twenty-seven).  More member states meant 
 
 26. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 3. 
 27. Id.. 
 28. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 8. 
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a greater number of emissions sources.  There is some evidence that 
market mechanisms are more attractive to regulators as the number 
of regulated sources increase.29  This could be because more sources 
means a bigger market and more options in terms of trading for the 
participants.  A command and control system is easier to administer 
when there is homogeneity in the market which is more likely with a 
smaller number of emitters.30  When the composition of the E.U. 
changed, it could also have altered the key players involved in 
negotiations shifting preferences towards emission trading. 
Once the Kyoto Protocol was signed, it became clear that an 
emissions trading scheme was going to happen in the future, because 
it was an integral component of the Protocol.  Under Kyoto, the E.U. 
had committed to an eight percent reduction of 1990 emission levels 
by 2012.  In order to meet its targets, the E.U. would need a common 
policy.31  Some E.U. member States like the U.K. and Denmark had 
already begun to develop emissions trading programs in their 
countries.32  To ensure that all the European nations could operate on 
a level playing field and to avoid fragmentation, it made sense for the 
E.U. to change its focus from a top down to a bottom up approach.33  
The E.U. could set up its own trading rules that would apply to the 
entire European bubble.  This harmonization would allow Europe to 
set the pace for a global trading scheme.  At the same time, a flexible 
market would permit individual nations to retain control over their 
own trading programs.34 
B. Industrial Influence 
In addition to the E.U.’s need to reject its tax initiatives, there 
was a strong pull from the industrial sector to implement an emissions 
trading program.  Although the industry was not enthusiastic about a 
carbon tax, they began to support market approaches like cap-and-
trade in the late 1990s.35  Signaling that trading markets could be 
 
 29. See Katrina Wyman, Why Regulators Turn to Tradable Permits: A Canadian Case 
Study, 52 U. Toronto L.J. 419, 497-99 (2002) (describing how governments tend to turn to 
market mechanisms as the number of pollution sources increase). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Woerdman, supra note 17, at 262. 
 33. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 7. 
 34. See PETER ZAPFEL & MATTI VAINIO, PATHWAYS TO EUROPEAN GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS TRADING HISTORY AND MISCONCEPTIONS 10-11 (2002). 
 35. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 10. 
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feasible in large industrial sectors, two major oil companies, BP and 
Shell, even started their own internal emissions trading markets in 
1998 and 2000, respectively.36  Furthermore, major non-governmental 
organizations supported emissions trading schemes in favor of 
uniform taxes.  Overall, there was “general support for emissions 
trading from a majority of business and industry groups across the 
E.U.”37 
C. Symbolic Politics 
Perhaps the most jarring event to occur during the E.U.’s 
decision-making process was the United States’ decision to officially 
withdraw from Kyoto negotiations in March of 2001.38  U.S. departure 
meant that the E.U. could become a major entrepreneur in the 
formation of a global trading market.39 Without the United States in 
the game, the E.U. could step into the forefront and condemn U.S. 
politics by posing itself as the champion of the environment. 
The United States’ rejection of international efforts also may 
have united European nations as common allies in the battle against 
global warming.41  If the E.U. could implement an ETS, it might serve 
to rebuild international momentum.  If an emissions trading scheme 
became a success, it could even possibly entice the United States to 
rejoin the international negotiation table.42  The European Union 
could use an ETS as a diplomatic tool in the future. 
D. Internal E.U. Politics 
Many external factors influenced the E.U. to adopt emissions 
trading, but internal dynamics also played a role.  In the late 1990s 
and early part of the 21st Century, central commission officials within 
the Directorate General Environment (DG ENV) started to support 
emissions trading.  One Commissioner, Jos Delbeke, was frustrated 
by the failure of the carbon tax, and he strongly desired to make 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 9. 
 38. ZAPFEL & VAINIO, supra note 34, at 12. 
 39. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16. 
 41. ZAPFEL & VAINIO, supra note 34, at 12. 
 42. See Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 41; see also David M. Driesen, Free 
Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, *27 (1998). 
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emissions trading a success.43  Peter Zapfel, who had studied 
emissions trading in the United States, joined the Commission in 
1998.44  Additionally, the commission received feedback from legal 
advisors and working groups that an emissions trading program could 
allow the E.U. to “exert control over the climate policy process and 
pull the E.U. together.”45 
Favorable internal politics also allowed the Commission to 
transform emissions trading from a proposal to a formal directive in 
only two years.  In comparison to the carbon tax, the flexibility and 
cost-effectiveness that an emissions trading scheme promised made it 
easier for DG ENV to sell their plan to DG Competition and DG 
Enterprise.46  Furthermore, because only a few E.U. member states 
had started to initiate trading programs on their own, the fear that an 
E.U. plan might clash with state initiatives was minimal.47  Even for 
those who may have opposed particular components of emissions 
trading, building a majority would have been difficult due to the 
complexity and breadth of the plan.48  Finally, the commission wisely 
left controversial decisions about caps and allocations with member 
states rather than debating them within the commission.49 
E. Learning from U.S. Experience 
Another factor that influenced the European Union’s change of 
heart was the learning process it underwent throughout its 
participation in the Kyoto process.  The United States first introduced 
the idea of emissions trading during Kyoto negotiations as a way to 
address climate change.50  The White House asked the Department of 
Justice to compile a report that would detail the advantages of 
emissions trading based on U.S. experience with trading programs.51  
The final Kyoto Protocol included emissions trading guidelines that 
were based on advice from U.S. negotiators.52  In essence, Kyoto 
 
 43. Id. at 6; Wettestad, supra note 20, at 12. 
 44. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 12. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. See id. at 13-15. 
 48. See id. at 13. (citing “declining disagreement” within the Commission because of “push 
and pull” factors in the proposal and a U.S. “pull-out of the global process”). 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and 
the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1310-1311 (2001). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1312-13. 
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borrowed the legal concept of emissions trading from U.S. national 
experience.  In much the same way, the E.U. was able to borrow the 
legal structures for trading from both Kyoto and U.S. advisors when 
designing its own national emissions trading scheme.53 
In addition, the European Commissioners consulted directly with 
U.S. economists about the potential for a trading market in 
greenhouse gas emissions.54  Experts with real-life experience in 
trading markets were able to give the E.U. advice about the strength 
and pitfalls of cap-and-trade systems.55  Because the clean air trading 
schemes for SO2
 and NOx in the United States had already been a 
success, the E.U. was also more willing to listen to U.S. 
recommendations.56  Additionally, much had been written about the 
trading programs that were already in existence.  The E.U. could use 
those materials in designing its own ETS.  Although the E.U. had 
been skeptical of trading systems in the past, concrete knowledge 
about the benefits of cap-and-trade systems may have sparked the 
E.U. to change its mind. 
Overall, there were a number of factors that may have influenced 
the E.U. to shift its focus from a tax scheme to an emissions trading 
market, including public perception and economic shifts.  However, it 
appears that the E.U. decided to embrace emission trading largely 
because it could realize gains for its industry and for its political 
leaders, both internally and in the eyes of the international 
community.   
The question still remains, however, whether the political process 
that caused the E.U. to make such a rapid policy shift will also result 
in environmental benefits.  Before discussing the effectiveness of the 
ETS, it is important to present the trading scheme in more detail. 
IV.  THE EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
Whether all or some of the above factors influenced the E.U. to 
support cap-and-trade, the E.U. was finally ready to adopt a formal 
ETS in 2003.  The E.U.’s ETS is a groundbreaking environmental 
achievement.  It incorporates twenty-five countries, six different 
industry sectors, and about 12,000 individual sources of carbon 
 
 53. For a thorough discussion of the concept of legal borrowing, see Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Better Regulation in Europe in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2006, VOL. 59 (eds. Jane Holder & 
Colm O’Cinneide); see also  Wiener, supra note 50. 
 54. Id. at 16. 
 55. Christiansen, supra note 14, at 6. 
 56. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16. 
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dioxide emissions.57  No other cap-and-trade system in history has 
been so large and covered so many different pollution sources.58  In 
comparison, the U.S. acid rain trading program for SO2 only covers 
one industrial sector and about 3,000 sources of pollution.  The U.S. 
NOx trading system only covers two industrial sectors and about 2,400 
sources of pollution.59  It is with good reason that critics have 
questioned whether the E.U. jumped into the ring too soon.60  
Assuring a successful ETS is going to be difficult due to the novelty of 
the program.  Before discussing the potential pitfalls of an ETS, 
however, this section will give a brief overview of the E.U. ETS—
what it covers and the details of the program.61 
Overall, the E.U. ETS is a flexibility mechanism that promotes 
the use of energy efficient technology and facilitates trading in order 
to help E.U. member states in reaching their Kyoto targets.62  The 
E.U. ETS is set to run in phases.  The first phase officially started in 
January of 2005 and is set to run until 2007.  After that, the ETS will 
run in successive five-year phases.63  At the end of every phase, the 
E.U. will review the process and make amendments.64  During the 
first phase, the ETS will only cover large industrial sectors.65  
Additionally, the only greenhouse gas that can be traded on the 
market in the first phase is CO2.
66  However, the E.U. will likely 
 
 57. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME (E.U.-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm? 
documentID=440 [hereinafter E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME]. 
 58. Id. at 4; Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies and Ocean Apart: E.U. & U.S. 
Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 464 (2006). 
 59. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 4. 
 60. See generally Wettestad, supra note 20. 
 61. ETS is only one part of the larger E.U. climate change program.  The climate change 
program is an umbrella program that “sets minimum emission reduction requirements for its 
member states [and] also provides a forum for community-wide coordination, voluntary 
programs, and trading schemes.”  Carlarne, supra note 58, at 460.  The entire climate change 
program includes voluntary agreements between the E.U. and European, Japanese, and Korean 
car manufacturers to produce cleaner automobiles, directives to target energy efficiency through 
best technology deployment, as well as regulations for pollution and landfills among other 
things.  Id. at 461.  This paper will only focus on the ETS within the larger climate change 
program. 
 62. See generally Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC); see also Carlarne, 
supra note 58, at 464. 
 63. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7. 
 64. Joseph Kruger & William Pizer, Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe, 46 
ENVIRONMENT 1, 8-10 (2004). 
 65. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7. 
 66. Id. 
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incorporate more sectors and more greenhouse gases during later 
phases.67 
The E.U. ETS incorporates six industrial sectors which cover a 
range of installations, including electricity and heat production plants 
with greater than 20MW capacity, oil refineries, coke ovens, metal, 
ore, and steel installations, cement kilns, glass and ceramics 
manufacturing plants, and paper, pulp, and board mills.68  In total, 
these industries embody about half of the total CO2 emissions in the 
E.U.  Notable industries which are not covered in the first phase but 
may be included later are transportation and building energy. 
At its core, the ETS is a system that facilitates the trade of CO2 
allowances.  There are a fixed amount of allowances which are 
distributed to firms at the beginning of every phase and can be traded 
during that phase.69  Firms must relinquish an allowance for every ton 
of CO2 emitted each year.
70  Individual E.U. member states determine 
the amount of allowances to be distributed in each state and the 
method of distribution.71  They are also required to establish 
electronic registries for allowances.  The commission oversees all the 
registries and monitors for irregularities.72  Each member state must 
detail their allocation decisions in a National Allocation Plan (NAP) 
that is submitted to the European Commission before the start of 
each phase.  The Commission reviews and analyzes all the NAPs 
based on eleven criteria including technical aspects, targets, and 
competition.73  Although some Member States did not submit their 
NAPs to the E.U. before the start of the first phase on January 1, 
2005,74 at this time, NAPs from all twenty-five states participating in 
the first phase have been submitted and approved, albeit with some 
modifications.75  Although banking of excesses allowances is allowed 
from year to year during the first phase, whether firms can bank from 
one phase to the next is left to member state discretion.76 
 
 67. See generally Kruger & Pizer, supra note 64. 
 68. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464. 
 72. See generally Kruger & Pizer, supra note 64. 
 73. Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464. 
 74. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 10. 
 75. Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464-65. 
 76. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 7-8. 
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Under the ETS, firms have the ability to opt—out of the ETS if 
they are using equivalent means to achieve reductions.77  Instead of 
applying to entire sectors, the opt-out option only applies to 
individual installations, and can only be used during the first phase.78  
Firms are also able to pool installations within sectors if they want to 
work together to meet industry targets.79  Additionally, member states 
are able to opt-in additional sources and sectors that are not already 
covered in the ETS.80 
The ETS lays out guidelines for monitoring, reporting, and 
verification of compliance.81  The guidelines describe different 
methodologies that are ordered in tiers based on degrees of 
accuracy.82  Although installations are supposed to use the top tier 
methodologies, they may petition member states to use 
methodologies from the lower tiers if they show that it is necessary.83  
All self-reported emissions must be verified by an independent third 
party.84 Member states may require, however, that firms provide 
private third party verification in order to reduce the burden on 
government resources.85 
The penalties are large if a firm emits more CO2 than is covered 
by its allowances—forty Euro per ton of CO2 emitted in the first 
phase and 100 Euro per ton after that.86  Firms are also required to 
make up missed reductions in the following year.  During the first 
phase, however, there is one relief.87  The European Commission can 
decide to issue additional, non-transferable allowances to a firm with 
unusually high emissions if there is a “force majeure” set of 
circumstances, or an act of God beyond the firm’s control.88 
Finally, the E.U. has issued a directive that will allow the E.U. to 
link its ETS to other trading schemes and also to project mechanisms 
 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Joseph Kruger, FROM SO2 TO GREENHOUSE GASES: TRENDS AND EVENTS SHAPING 
FUTURE EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-05-20.pdf. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 14-15. 
 84. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8. 
 85. Kruger, supra note 81, at 15. 
 86. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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of the Kyoto Protocol like the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM).89  The E.U. 
can link to other trading schemes through bilateral agreements.  At 
this time, no linkages to other schemes have been finalized under the 
directive90 although Norway has agreed to link its trading program to 
the E.U. ETS under the European Economic Area Agreement and is 
currently awaiting approval from Iceland and Liechtenstein.91 
As for the Kyoto mechanisms, firms can use credits from 
developing countries under the CDM in the first phase and firms can 
use credits from other countries under the JIM starting in the second 
phase.92  There is no limit to the CDM credits in the first phase, but 
after that member states will decide how many CDM and JIM credits 
they will allow in their NAPs. 93 
V.  POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
The E.U. ETS is the first of its kind.  It is the largest cap-and-
trade program in world history.94  It also utilizes a decentralized 
approach for the setting of caps and the allocation of allowances, as 
well as the monitoring of industry emissions, something that  is 
relatively novel for cap-and-trade programs.95  As a result, the E.U. 
ETS has been widely criticized.96  This section will briefly summarize 
the major criticisms of the E.U. ETS and potential future pitfalls for 
the program. 
One of the most controversial features of the E.U. ETS is that it 
leaves decisions about caps and allocation to member states.  Leaving 
such important decisions to the discretion of member states can be 
dangerous for a number of reasons.  First, they might be influenced 
by political pressure to grant more allowances to industry than they 
should, meaning less emissions reduction than is needed to meet 
 
 89. Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18. 
 90. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8. 
 91. Press Release, The Norwegian Government Accepts to Include the EU Emissions 
Trading Directive in the EEA Agreement (March 2006), available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Press-Centre/Press-releases/2006/Norway-accept-EU-
Emissions-Trading-Directive.html?id=419857. 
 92. Id. at 8-9. 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 6. 
 96. See, e.g., Richard N. Cooper, Alternatives to Kyoto: The Case for a Carbon Tax (Nov. 
9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
cooper/papers/Kyoto_ct.pdf. 
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Kyoto targets.97  There is some evidence that member states have 
already over-allocated emissions so much that they might have 
difficulty meeting the reductions required under Kyoto.98 
Second, member states may try to game the system by granting a 
large number of allowances to one particular industry in order to gain 
a competitive advantage in that industry over other member states.99  
This would be similar to the race to the bottom scenario that is often 
described when discretion for environmental regulation is left to 
states of the United States.100  The fear is that states will race to 
institute the least friendly environmental regulations in order to 
attract industry to the state.101  In the case of the E.U. ETS, such 
gaming may create industry losers who do not have the resources to 
effectively lobby member state governments for allowances.  
Additionally, it may again lead to over-allocation for particular 
industries. 
Third, not all E.U. member states have the institutional capacity 
to effectively allocate and monitor allowances.102  There will likely be 
some variability amongst member states in terms of how vigorously 
they enforce emissions regulations.103  Large differences between 
member states may create inconsistencies that undermine the E.U. 
ETS by creating an uneven playing field, thus threatening the 
efficiency of the program.104  Member states may also differ as to how 
they accredit third-party verifiers.105  Already, differences exist 
between member states regarding the rules for accreditation and 
verification.106  If verification differences are significant, allowances 
could become less valuable because the enforcement of the rights that 
accompany allowances will be unpredictable. 
Another potential pitfall of the E.U. ETS is the process of 
submitting and reviewing NAPs, which has been an “extremely high 
profile and contentious process.”107  Because of the above-described 
 
 97. Kurkowski, supra note 7, at 710-11; Kruger, supra note 81, at 15. 
 98. Kurkowski, supra note 7, at 711-16, 717-23. 
 99. Id.; Kruger, supra  note 81, at 15. 
 100. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 Ecology L.Q. 183, 201-02 (2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Kruger, supra note 81, at 15. 
 103. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 11. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 12. 
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problems, the European Commission has had to reject NAPs from 
some member states and has even had to threaten legal action in 
order to encourage them to speed up the process of making allocation 
decisions.108  The difficulty in creating NAPs could cause member 
states to expend extra administrative costs in order to implement an 
ETS.  In the long run, member states might even become 
disenfranchised with the entire program. 
Aside from the NAPs, another worry concerning the E.U. ETS is 
the potential for “hot air”, a term to describe empty allowances which 
do not actually result in any decrease in emissions.109  A potential 
source for hot air might come from the Russian Federation.110  The 
Kyoto Protocol granted Russia extra allowances to sell as an incentive 
to join Kyoto.111  Although the extra allowances are not recognized in 
the E.U. ETS, member states can still purchase credits from Russia in 
order to meet Kyoto targets.112  As a result, member states could 
commit to fewer reductions within the ETS program if they are able 
to meet Kyoto targets using Russian credits. 
The E.U.’s decision to grandfather allowances instead of 
auctioning them has also been controversial.  In the first phase, 
member states are only allowed to auction up to five percent of 
allowances; in the second phase, only ten percent may be auctioned.113  
The grandfathering of most of the permits means that current 
emitters will receive free allowances based on a percentage of their 
current emissions, rather than having to purchase the allowances 
during an auction.114  Under this system, new industrial installations 
will have a difficult time entering the market.  New entrants will 
typically have equal footing with old emitters in a cap-and-trade 
market if both are forced to purchase allowances at an auction.115 An 
imbalance emerges in the E.U. ETS system because new entrants will 
largely be forced to purchase allowances while old emitters will get 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 14-15. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Choi, supra note 12, at 920. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 251, 270-73 (2006). 
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allowances for free.  Member governments may also be losing out on 
potential revenues that could be derived from auctions.116 
VI.  DID THE E.U. MOVE TOO FAST? 
Considering all the criticism surrounding the E.U. ETS and its 
high profile status in the international community, it is logical to ask 
whether the positive politics that caused the E.U. to rapidly adopt 
emissions trading may have resulted in environmental losses .  As 
stated above, the European Commission turned the ETS from a 
proposal to a directive at a quick pace.  The Commission went from 
being an enemy of emissions trading to one of its biggest supporters 
at the same break-neck speed.  Nevertheless, the E.U. has not 
embarked on this unique cap-and-trade program completely blind-
folded.  The E.U. conducted considerable reviews of the emissions 
trading process before the official start of the ETS and it has 
continued those reviews during the two years that it has been in 
operation. 
To begin with, it is important to remember that the E.U. was not 
working off a blank slate when it started to consider emissions trading 
in the late 1990s.  Emissions trading programs had already been 
successful in reducing SO2 and NO2 in the United States.  Many 
countries had also used cap-and-trade and permit systems to manage 
a wide variety of resources from fisheries to water.117  Out of these 
programs grew a large amount of research on flexible market 
mechanisms as an alternative for environmental regulation.118  
Considerable amounts of scholarship and commentary also existed on 
the costs and benefits as well as the uncertainties associated with 
different facets of trading systems.119  In reality, the E.U. had a wide 
array of knowledge to utilize when it designed its own ETS. 
In addition to the research that already existed on other trading 
systems, before issuing a final directive the E.U. commissioned its 
own studies on the effects of a trading system on E.U. member states 
as well as the effects of different options associated with a trading 
scheme.120  The E.U. also consulted U.S. advisors with direct 
experience in trading systems throughout the ETS approval process.121 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 252-53. 
 118. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel B. Radov, NAT’L. ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INITIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN A EUROPEAN UNION 
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As a result, the E.U. did take lessons from previous emissions 
trading systems when designing the E.U. ETS.  Even though certain 
elements of the E.U. ETS have been criticized, there are a number of 
components which have been applauded.  For example, the ETS has 
extremely tough penalties which make the rights associated with 
allowances more powerful.  The U.S. experience with the SO2 trading 
program likely influenced the E.U. to include strong penalties in its 
ETS.122  Part of the success of the SO2 trading program in the United 
States is attributable to the strict compliance components of the 
system.123  The European Commission even cited the compliance 
record of the U.S. SO2 program in its draft directive for an ETS.
124 
In addition, the E.U. has wisely chosen to continue its evaluation 
of the ETS after the program’s implementation.  The E.U. 
commissioned McKinsey & Company and Ecofys to monitor and 
review the program during the first two years of operation.125  
Recently, those companies released the results of a survey which ran 
from June to September of 2005 and involved “517 companies, 
government bodies, industry associations, market intermediaries and 
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations).”126  The survey results 
demonstrated that the E.U. ETS is impacting corporate behavior.127  
They also showed that the participants were most interested in the 
long-term variables of the ETS, including the setting of caps and 
allocation rules into the future.128  However, there was no consensus 
among participants about the best approaches regarding those 
alternatives.129 
In November of 2006, the European Commission released a 
report with a preliminary review of the ETS program since its 
 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING SCHEME (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/allocation.pdf; P. Capros & L. Mantzos, THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF E.U.-WIDE INDUSTRY-LEVEL EMISSION TRADING TO REDUCE 
GREENHOUSE GASES (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/climate_ 
change/primes.pdf. 
 121. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16. 
 122. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 11. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. McKinsey & Co. & Ecofys, REVIEW OF E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: SURVEY 
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/highlights_ets_ 
en.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 2. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 3. 
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inception.130  The Commission found that ninety-nine percent of firms 
had fulfilled their emissions reporting requirements for 2005 
emissions and that the emissions of greenhouse gases were lower than 
expected in the first year of the program.131  At the same time, the 
commission recognized that the certainty and predictability of the 
program needs to be improved and that there needs to be more 
stakeholder involvement.132 
In response, the E.U. established a separate working group to 
examine the E.U. ETS in greater detail.133  The working group will 
consist of “experts from the commission, member states, academics, 
industry, and the NGO community.”134  The working group will solicit 
input from interested parties, utilize reports from member states on 
their ETS experiences, and consult other outside recommendations.135  
It will be focusing primarily on four topics.  First, the working group 
will investigate whether the ETS directive should increase its scope to 
include additional industrial sectors and/or greenhouse gas 
emissions.136  Second, it will conduct a complete reassessment of the 
NAPs and their impact on the consistency within the market.137  It will 
consider the option of instituting a single cap that would apply to all 
member states.138  The working group will also explore whether 
granting allowances for five-year periods creates enough certainty for 
potential investors.139  Third, the group will consider whether 
monitoring and compliance should be more consistent between 
member states in order to improve harmonization.140  Finally, the 
working group will study the option of linking the ETS to other 
trading schemes as well as whether the ETS should continue to 
 
 130. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Building a Global 
Carbon Market – Report Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC, COM (2006) 676 final 
(Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/com2006_ 
676final_en.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 3.  The report noted that the decrease in emissions could reflect actual reductions, 
but that they may also reflect an over-estimate of baseline emissions.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 5. 
 133. Id. at 6. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 7. 
 137. Id. at 7-8. 
 138. Id. at 8. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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recognize credits under the Kyoto Protocol.141  The conclusions of the 
working group will be translated into legislative proposals and 
applied to the third phase of the ETS.142 
The E.U. has also completed a final regulatory impact 
assessment for the E.U. ETS in compliance with the Better 
Regulation Initiative and under guidance from the European 
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines.143  The assessment 
considers the uncertainties of the E.U. ETS as well as the major 
benefits and costs of the program.  The assessment concludes that the 
benefits of the program adequately justify the costs.144 
To be sure, the E.U. did not conduct as much regulatory analysis 
as agencies in the United States usually do when they issue new 
regulations.  In particular, the E.U. did not consider regulatory 
alternatives in conducting its assessment of the costs and benefits.  It 
also did not integrate as much public participation. 145 
Returning to the influence of politics, the question remains 
whether the E.U. maintained the correct balance between political 
gains and environmental effectiveness.  It could be argued that 
politics may have allowed the E.U. to achieve the most environmental 
gains possible at the time.  Section III described the confluence of 
factors that played into the E.U.’s decision to charge ahead with 
emissions trading.  It may be that all those factors together created 
the “perfect storm” of opportunity for the E.U..  At any other time, 
an ETS may not have had such broad political appeal or the ability to 
pass muster with all the E.U. member states.  But, in truth, it is still 
too early to make a sweeping statement.  The possibility remains that 
the E.U. ETS may flounder and ultimately fail as a solution to rising 
global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Even so, the E.U. has conducted an adequate assessment of 
emissions trading alternatives in order to justify its actions under the 
ETS.  More importantly, the E.U. has continued to re-evaluate and 
re-assess its ETS at every step.  Even though the ETS contains a 
number of flaws and will continue to experience set backs as it 
 
 141. Id. at 8-9. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. See PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 791) (2005). 
 144. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME FULL REGULATORY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 42 (2005), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climate 
change/trading/eu/pdf/euets-finalria.pdf. 
 145. Stephen M. Johnson, Economics vs. Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 417, 450-54 (2001). 
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evolves, the E.U. has continuously recognized the inadequacy and 
failings of the ETS as it has progressed.  ’Further, the E.U. is making 
strides to integrate stakeholder participation throughout the 
assessment process. 
Because the threats from global warming are so ominous, the 
speed with which the E.U. initiated its ETS is less important than the 
fact that the E.U. has taken action in the face of risk.  The E.U. has 
not jumped the gun.  As the European Commission has stated, the 
“cost of inaction on climate change potentially has much greater costs 
than those associated with the implementation and running of the 
E.U. ETS.”146  Of course, the gravity of the situation requires the E.U. 
to take extreme care with any action.  In a sense, the E.U. is 
shouldering the burdens of the planet by investing resources into an 
ETS promise.  Even so, it was more important for the E.U. to 
continue moving swiftly forward in the face of uncertainty rather than 
freezing up against the enormity of the problem. 
In the end, the entire experience of the E.U. ETS has spawned 
interesting conclusions.  First, politics in the E.U. to address climate 
change can largely be attributed to reducing costs and increasing the 
likelihood of adoption by heterogeneous member states.  Throughout 
the international negotiation process, the E.U. acted in a way that was 
most advantageous for itself.  Although the E.U. likely had in mind 
the larger threat of global warming, it directed its policies in a way 
that created economic and political gains for the E.U.  Second, 
political influences that focus on rent seeking may also result in 
environmental success, especially when it comes to market 
mechanisms.  The flexible nature of cap-and-trade solutions may 
allow governments to monitor programs and adjust them for changes 
in both politics and the environment.  Finally, political factors may 
have different environmental outcomes depending on the varying 
levels of risk  Global climate change is a unique challenge.  Although 
the E.U. needed to act quickly to address climate change, such head-
strong approaches may not be appropriate in all situations. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The E.U. ETS is a revolutionary new program that will have far-
reaching implications for the world in its attempts to battle global 
climate change.  The development and evolution of the ETS has been 
fascinating both because of the speed with which it happened and 
 
 146. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 143, at 42. 
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because the E.U. has not consistently been a strong supporter of 
market mechanisms.  There are a number of reasons the E.U. may 
have turned to emissions trading: because there was no political 
support for a carbon tax, because there was strong industry backing 
for a cap-and-trade system, because U.S. experience with market 
mechanisms had already been successful, or because immediate 
action was called for after the United States dropped out of Kyoto 
negotiations. 
Whatever the impetus, the E.U. ETS is one of the great 
environmental policy experiments.  Notwithstanding the remaining 
hurdles, the E.U.’s experience demonstrates that international 
environmental politics is a complicated process.  To be sure, 
policymaking is a delicate balance and it is not always wise to invest 
in untested resolutions.  However, the E.U. has been able to both act 
quickly and to continuously readjust itself.  Upon close examination, 
it appears that the E.U. used trading negotiations to its advantage, 
accepting trading as an alternative only when the E.U. had something 
to gain from trading.  Once the E.U. recognized the benefits of 
trading, it was able to push the policy through rapid development and 
initiation.  Positive rent-seeking may have caused the E.U. to act 
quickly, but the E.U. has taken precautions to better ensure that its 
trading scheme will be environmentally effective.  Considering the 
extreme dangers of climate change, the E.U.’s level of commitment is 
sufficient to justify speedy action. 
